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Abstract

This paper examines the correlates of rentier returns – returns to the ownership of
financial assets -- in a sample of OECD countries between 1960 and 2000. We develop a
simple bargaining model among three classes – industrial capitalists, rentiers and workers –
and show that rentier income returns increase when domestic and foreign real interest rates
costs of capital mobility fall, and the power of labor declines. Using an unbalanced panel
dataset, the paper also econometrically investigates the impacts of proxies for these
variables on rentier incomes. We find that interest rate liberalization, the reduction in the
unionization rate of labor, and increased returns from foreign financial investments increase
rentier returns. These results provide support both for the simple model and for common
Post-Keynesian and Marxian stories of the impact of financialization and neo-liberal policy
changes on income shares.
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“Finance reasserted its power and interests in relation to workers, company managers,
those responsible for economic and social policies in governments, and public and
semipublic institutions, both national and international. Prioritizing the fight against
inflation, the new course of events refocused economic activity on capital profitability
and payments to creditors and stockholders”
Dumenil and Levy (2004)
Chairman Greenspan: “You realize that the labor unions would say that was awful: you
say it’s wonderful”
Mr. Syron: “That’s right, but we are not in an AFL-CIO meeting. And they have a little
different view than we do on what is considered wage inflation.”
From the Federal Open Market Committee Transcript, February 1990
(Quoted in Mitchell and Erickson, 2002)

I. Introduction
In recent years, interest has grown in the increasingly important role that financial
markets, actors and institutions have been playing in the operations of capitalist economies
over the last two decades, and the implications this has had for the distribution of income
and wealth within countries. The resurgence of interest has occurred as a result of a
sequence of devastating financial crises in developing countries in the last several decades,
the increased size of financial markets relative to the size of the real economy, and the
extraordinary spread of financial liberalization and privatization of financial institutions in
recent years. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the reassertion of finance has been treated by
much of mainstream economics as deserving of no more attention than the rise of any other
sub-sector of the economy. By contrast, researchers drawing from the alternative traditions
of Keynes and Marx 1 have seen this as a fundamental change in the character of modern
capitalism. As a consequence, the process of "financialization" has been the central concern
of several political economy studies in the recent past. A far from exhaustive list would
include Pauly 1997; Henwood 1998, Boyer, 2000, Yeldan, 2000; Brenner, 2002 Dumenil
and Levy, 2004, 2005; Patnaik, 2003, Krippner, 2005; Epstein, 2005; Crotty, 2005).
A story emerges from much of this literature, a condensed version of which goes like
this: historical and political changes have led to expanded role for financial markets and for
an array of institutions and individuals that are actively involved in these markets and obtain
returns from them. We use a somewhat old- fashioned term- the ‘rentiers’ to describe these
actors 2 .While we do not pretend that there is anything approaching a consensus on the
constituent elements of this class, many definitions have some common elements. It is often
argued that members of this class (variously defined) have benefited directly by virtue of the
1
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This has been an important question within the Marxian literature since at least Hilferding (1981)
See Epstein and Jayadev (2005) for more discussion of these issues.
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expansion of the markets they operate in and the assets they hold. The conditions which
have enhanced the returns to rentiers have been, it is argued, endogenously generated. As
the rentier class has become more powerful, they have been able to more effectively
promote policies which benefit them. Thus for example policies that prioritize low inflation,
low budget deficits or the promotion of anti-union legislation (to reduce wage –push
inflation) all received support from increasingly politically important rentier interests.
Similarly financial deregulation, both domestically and internationally has expanded the
scope and domestic financial liberalization to give them more profit making opportunities;
and have been promoted by rentier interests as well 3 .
Our paper seeks to formalize and empirically evaluate these claims. Specifically, we
operationalize one definition of the income of the rentier class following from Kalecki
(1990) and we investigate its correlates in a panel of 14 OECD countries. In order to do this,
we present a formal bargaining model that captures some of the relationships that have been
explored in the literature.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. In the next section we outline a simple
bargaining model of the rentier return which is elaborated in appendix B. In the following
section we define our measure of rentier incomes and describe basic trends in that measure
in a sample of OECD countries since the 1960’s. In section III, we present a panel data
analysis of the determinants of rentier incomes for a sub-sample of OECD countries, in an
attempt to assess the impacts of a variety of policy and structural variables on rentier
incomes. In the final, concluding, section, we draw out the implications of our work, and
make some suggestions for future research.
II.

A simple bargaining model of the rentier return

Much of the existing political economy literature on the functional distribution of income
implicitly or explicitly analyzes this in terms of the dynamics of an economy with three
classes: workers, industrial capitalists and financial capitalists. The formulation dates from a
classical economic viewpoint. However, perhaps for reasons of tractability and clarity, most
studies restrict the analysis to the relationship between only two of the three classes 4 . Thus,
for example, Harrison (2002), and Jayadev (2005) model the bargaining relationship
between industrial capital and labor, while Stockhammer (2006) consider the conflicts
between industrial and financial capital.
While these studies are useful, our macroeconomic analysis of the trends and correlates of
the rentier return needs to be founded in a model which considers the interrelationships
between all three of these classes, and, toward this end, we present here a simple model on
the determinants of rentier return in a bargaining framework with the three groups. The
model is meant to illustrate and motivate some of the key correlates of the rentier return as
3
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discussed in many different accounts of the resurgence of the financial capitalist class. The
model itself is presented in the appendix.
The central purpose of the model is to establish the implicit insight in many accounts that
that if we consider rentiers to be a distinct class whose input into production
(liquidity/finance) commands a return out of the operating surplus from production, then
their returns depends on the political power of competing groups (industrial capitalists and
labor) and on policies that increase their fallback options (such as international and national
deregulation of finance).
II. Rentier Incomes in OECD Countries: Definition, Data Source and Trends
Rentier Income
As noted before, there is no commonly accepted definition of rentier returns. Most
authors use a definition to denote income that accrues from activity in the financial sector
and the ownership of financial assets rather than activity in the “real” sector or the holding
of “real” assets such as real estate or capital equipment used in the non-financial sector. For
example, Keynes, in his General Theory, refers to the rentier as “the functionless investor,”
who generates income via his ownership of capital, thus exploiting its “scarcityvalue”(Keynes 1936). Here, we are interested in a definition that reflects the class forces in
modern capitalist economies, and have chosen a definition consistent with the work of
Michal Kalecki. As Kalecki used the term, rentier income represents the income received by
owners of financial firms, plus the return to holders of financial assets generally. (Kalecki,
1990). Defined this way, rentier income reflects returns to those who own financial assets,
either directly or indirectly by owning the profits accruing to financial sector firms. This
distinguishes rentier income from income earned from labor and income earned from
owning non-financial firms. 5
More specifically, rentier return, as calculated in this paper, consists of the profits
earned by firms engaged primarily in financial intermediation plus interest income realized
by all non-financial non-government resident units, i.e. the rest of the private economy. In
principle, rentier return should include capital gains on financial assets realized by all nonfinancial non-government resident institutional units. However, in practice, these are
virtually impossible to get reliable time series across countries for and hence we confine our
analysis to returns to financial capital excluding capital gains.
We obtain our data for the rentier return from the annual United Nations Publication:
National Accounts Statistics: Main Aggregates and Detailed Tables.The UN dataset is a
regularly published and consistent series, based on the system of national accounts, 1968. It
5

Of course, a worker can receive some “rentier income” to the extent that she owns financial assets. The same
goes for the CEO of an industrial firm. This allows us to include the returns that owners of industrial firms
receive from their direct ownership of financial assets, but we are not able to separate out the amount of
industrial firms’ profit that come from financial market activities. (See Crotty, 2005, on the data difficulties
involved). Krippner (2005) discusses this issue at length and has very interesting estimates of the share of
non-finanical corporate profits that come from financial transactions. According to her figures, they have risen
a great deal in the case of the U.S. over the last three decades.
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is estimated on the basis of surveys of enterprises or establishments and government
accounts. We define the ‘inflation adjusted rentier return’ as the income flow to rentiers less
the reduction in wealth coming from inflation. The specifics of our measure of the rentier
return are provided in detail in appendices A and B. We then define the rentier fraction of
GDP, or alternatively the rentier return normalized by GDP or the rentier share as this
measure divided by real GDP 6 .
Our analysis focuses on OECD countries for which all the elements required to
construct this Kaleckian measure are available. This has the disadvantage of reducing the
potential sample size but is necessary for ensuring the cross sectional comparability of the
data. Our data is unevenly spread and runs from the 1970s for most countries (1960 for the
US) to 1996. The data stops in that year since the United Nations revised their collection
based on the system of national accounts 1993 and therefore stopped collecting data on
adequately disaggregated levels from 1996 onwards.
Table 2 summarizes for each country the trend of the inflation adjusted rentier
fraction of GDP. For all countries for which we have data, the inflation adjusted rentier
fraction was higher in the 1980's and 1990's than it was in the 1960's and 1970's. These data,
then, are consistent with the notion that real rentier returns have gone up since the time the
neo-liberal period was initiated in the early 1980's. Sometimes these changes have been
nothing short of dramatic. In Portugal, for example, the increase in the inflation adjusted
rentier return is nearly a fifth of GDP. There is substantial contrast between countries.
Australia, Great Britain and the U.S have seen increases in the real rentier return fraction of
nearly a tenth of GDP since the heyday of inflation in the 1970s. By contrast, continental
economies such as Germany and Netherlands have seen smaller increases.
Since two price factors determine our measure of the normalized rentier returnnominal returns (positively) and inflation rates (negatively), we can see at least four likely
factors that contributed to the trends we observe evident in the political economy literature .
The first is the shift to hawkish monetary policies in the UK and US around 1979 or 1980.
These policies ushered in an era of much lower inflation and high real interest rates, an era
that, with some variation across time and space is still with us. Table 3 reports data on real
interest rates in the OECD countries, showing the contrast between the 1960’s and 1970’s
on the one hand, and the 1980’s and 1990’s on the other. It shows that in most countries,
real interest rates rose significantly between the two periods, a trend consistent with the
increase in rentier returns reported above. The profound change in monetary policy ushered
in by the Thatcher government in the UK and Paul Volcker in the U.S spread throughout the
OECD with greater pressures for central bank independence, inflation targeting and through
the inter-linking of interest rates brought on by financial liberalization and international
capital mobility.
6

Strictly speaking, this variable is not a share of income, for several reasons. The rentier return variable and
GDP variable are calculated from different accounts: property income (i.e. interest and dividend income) is
derived from the secondary distribution of income account in the UN SNA 1968, while GDP is a concept from
the primary distribution of income. In other words, rentier income received is not necessarily from current
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payments among private sector actors. As a result, this rentier measure is best thought of as a “gross”, rather
than a “net” measure of rentier income (see Epstein and Jayadev (2005) for more discussion of this point.)
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This financial liberalization is the second important factor accounting for the
increase in rentier returns. Widespread financial liberalization allowed for increases in real
interest rates, and for the dramatic expansion of financial activities and profits. The
elimination of capital controls in most of these countries also likely contributed to higher
rates of returns on financial assets and increased opportunity for financial sector profit. In
principle, opening the capital account ought to contribute to financial profit opportunities as
detailed by our model.
A third structural and policy change – the move toward fiscal austerity - has, in
principle, mixed effects on rentier returns. On the one hand reduced government deficits
reduce the rate of increase of government debt and thereby, all else equal, reduce
government interest payments to rentiers. On the other hand, to the extent that reductions in
budget deficits reduce inflationary pressures, they might contribute to increases in real
interest rates and to increases in rentier returns.
A fourth factor is the reorientation of political n political power away from other
classes and toward the rentier class 7 . The post 1980 period has been shown to be associated
with a decline in labor returns in many countries (Jayadev, 2003; Diwan, 2000; Harrison,
2002). With financial liberalization and tight monetary policy, the rentier class as well as
industrial capitalists may benefit from the reduction in the strength of organized labor.
While non-financial corporations are in accord with rentiers in this case, higher real interest
rates and financial liberalization might mean a more difficult profit environment for nonfinancial corporations, unless of course, they become more like financial firms themselves.
To this extent, rentiers and industrial capitalists diverge in their interests.

IV.

Correlates of Rentier Returns in the OECD: An Econometric Analysis

In this section we use rentier data described in the previous section to estimate the
impact of policy and structural factors on rentier returns in a panel of OECD countries. The
time period covered by the analysis differs by country, depending upon data availability, but
usually covers the period 1960’s-1990’s. Our measure of the rentier return is the ratio of the
inflation-adjusted rentier return to the real gross domestic product of the country (or what
we have also described as the real rentier fraction of GDP).
The goal of this exercise is to provide empirical verification for the story we have
outlined (as have others) as to the increase in rentier’s returns. Thus we carry out panel data
analysis on a sample of 14 OECD countries for which the data were available to assess the
impact of changes in bargaining power, financial deregulation, financial structure and other
plausible determinants on the evolution of rentier returns.
At the outset we require an indicator for the relative scarcity of capital. Ceteris paribus
the return to capital (both physical and financial) should be higher where the relative
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endowment of capital is lower. Our proxy for the capital labor ratio is the real GDP per
worker obtained from the Penn world tables, version 6.1.
Our measure of the bargaining power of labor is a common one. We utilize the total
trade union membership as a fraction of the labor force from the OECD labor market
statistics. The same or similar measures have been used, for example by Harrison, 2002,
Ortega and Rodriguez, 2001, Jayadev 2005. Trade union membership is expected to have a
direct negative effect on rentier return by shifting productive rents toward workers (from our
model) and an indirect effect by making the implementation of neo-liberal policies less
likely. Figure 1 provides some evidence for this in four countries in our sample and the
same pattern can be seen in many of the other countries as well.
Data on domestic interest rate liberalization is obtained from the work of Mehrez and
Kaufmann (1999). It takes the form of a dummy in every year following domestic interest
rate and lending rate liberalization. We should expect the rentier return to rise in the short
term following such a policy shift, given that financial regulations have typically repressed
real interest rates below market clearing levels. Figure 2 shows the average real rentier
return before and after interest rate liberalization. In all countries, there is a definite increase
in this measure following liberalization.
Most measures of international financial openness are constructed from the International
Monetary Fund’s annual publication of the IMF “Exchange arrangements and Exchange
restrictions (for examples see Quinn 1997, Lee and Jayadev 2005, Mody and Murshid
2001). We use the Mody and Murshid index which extends the IMF analysis to 1998. The
measure ranges from 1-4 with 1 being the least open and 4 being the most open as measured
by existing restrictions on capital inflows and outflows in all international accounts.
The degree of government involvement in the economy is proxied using two variables: the
budget deficit (from the Government Financial Statistics) and the Government Share of
GDP (from the Penn World Tables 6.1). Our priors are not clear for either. For example, the
general presumption has been that rentiers have opposed budget deficits as inflationary,
although budget deficits also represent a risk free source of returns to them, especially if real
interest rates are positive.
In order to capture changes in the general political structure, we use a measure of the
political orientation of the government as developed by Beck et al (2001) which codes
governments as left leaning, centrist or right-leaning. We code a variable RIGHTWING as
having values 1, 2 and 3 is if it left leaning, centrist or right leaning respectively.
We utilize variables on the financial structure of the economy from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt
and Levine (1999). We look specifically at two types of variables. The first measures
banking activity in general and indicates the ratio of deposits to GDP. This has been a
common measure of the depth of the financial system. We also use the ratio of central bank
assets to GDP as an inverse measure of the degree of financial sophistication. The
presumption in this case would be that the more financially developed an economy is, the
larger is the proportion of assets held in the private financial system, and therefore, the
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lower the ratio of central bank assets to GDP. These variables are designed to control for the
commonsensical idea that as the economy becomes more “financialized”, we would expect
the rentier return to increase simply as a function of an increase in that sector's economic
activity, independently of the other policy and power variations that we study.

Econometric Results
Our dataset is relatively limited, containing 292 observations across 14 countries for the
period 1960-1996. This is a relatively small sample at the outset and given that the
independent variables are unevenly distributed, adding independent reduces the sample size
available and that raises the standard errors. We begin therefore by specifying a base
equation in which we regress the rentier return on a trend variable and then sequentially add
controls in the order that keeps the sample size as large as possible. The results are shown
in table 4.
Some consistent results do emerge across specifications. First, the trend variable is positive
and significant across all specifications suggesting some unexplained and persistent time
effects on the rentier return.
Across all specifications, the coefficient on the proxy for relative capital endowmentsproxied by real GDP per worker is negative. This suggests that one important factor
determining rentier returns is changes in endowments: increases in the GDP per worker are
associated with a fall in rentier returns.
Our measure of the bargaining power of labor-trade union membership- as expected, a
strong negative correlate of the rentier return. A 1 percentage point increase in union
membership is associated with a 1.5-2.5 percentage point decrease in the rentier return. The
evidence supports the contention that the decline in the political power of organized labor
across many OECD countries through the last two decades may be one of the causes of the
resurgence of the rentier return, or indeed one of its consequences.
Equally, the variables which are associated with the fallback position of financial capital,
(interest rate liberalization and the achievable rate of return abroad) enter the model with the
expected signs. The effect of interest rate liberalization is, in particular, striking. All else
constant, eliminating domestic controls on the interest rate yields a consistent positive effect
on the rentier return in the order of 2-4 percentage points Increases in the fall back position
of financial capital abroad increases the rentier returns of capital. More specifically,
financial openness and financial openness interacted with the foreign interest rate both also
impact the rentier return positively in most specifications, although these effects are very
small. Since the fallback position of the rentier is the maximal alternative return to the
rentier which could come from a domestic asset, a foreign asset or both, we perform a test of
joint significance on the interest rate liberalization and the achievable foreign rate in all
specifications which include both these variables. As we expected, the null that the
coefficients on these variables are zero is decisively rejected.
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We find intriguing, but not entirely robust evidence that political orientation matters. The
coefficient on the variable RIGHTWING is positive in all specifications, and significant in
most. Even controlling for trends, then, there is some evidence that rentiers do better when
the political orientation of the government moves to the right.
Perhaps surprisingly, there is no impact of government intervention in the economy, either
through the channel of budget deficits or through the general level of government
intervention into the economy. In fact, various other measures of indebtedness, both of the
public and the private sector were tried 8 , with various lag structures, none of which
provided a discernible impact on the rentier return. This finding runs counter to a common
narrative that rentiers have benefited from the large expansion of public and private debt
accumulated in response to the requirements of the welfare state 9 . Even if the story is true
of some countries (perhaps the United States), it is certainly not detectable in a crosscountry context.
Finally, our measures of the financial structure of the economy provide mixed evidence.
While the depth of the banking system, as measured by the deposits to GDP ratio does not
have a statistically significant impact on the rentier return, the degree of financial
diversification, as measured negatively by the concentration of assets in the central bank has
a significant effect on the rentier return of income. The size of the coefficient varies between
a decrease in 0.3 to 0.7 percentage points in the rentier return for every percentage point
increase in the central bank assets to GDP ratio. Note also that the financial openness
variable loses significance once diversification within the financial system is controlled for,
suggesting strong correlation between the two variables.
Tables 5a and 5 b repeat the full regression model using generalized least squares to control
for within panel heteroskedasticity and a generalized method of moments estimator (the
Arellano-Bond estimator) to control for omitted variables. As is evident, the main results
remain unchanged with these estimations as well.
The reader will note that we do not test for the effect of changes in the bargaining power of
industrial capital and its role on the rentier return. The primary reason for this was our
inability to find a measure which could accurately capture the bargaining power of industrial
capital rather than capital in general in a consistent manner across countries. We did use
measures such as value added in manufacturing as an indirect indicator of the bargaining
power of industrial firms (the logic being that with a larger bargaining power of industrial
capital, the ratio of value added in manufacturing to total output should be higher) and found
significant negative effects for this variable on the rentier return. However this, like other
indicators we considered is an outcome variable and not directly a measure of bargaining
power. As a result, we have not reported these regressions here.
In addition to the variables reported above, we tried several other variables to test for other
determinants, or other measures of these same determinants. For example, we tested various
8
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measures of the age structure of the population which were insignificant. We also estimated
the relationship between the rentier return and the labor share of income. We generally
found a consistent negative relationship as might be expected. We also tested a measure of
central bank independence, but given the lack of variation in these measures over time, we
were not surprised to see insignificant results. Finally, we also used various other measures
of globalization, especially with respect to trade and found generally economically and
statistically insignificant results.
In general, the variables we reported in the table above are robust determinants of rentier
income, and, more importantly, reflect many of the structural and political economy
variables we described at the outset of the paper.

V.

Summary and Conclusion

We believe that these econometric results provide support for the increasingly popular story
that neo-liberalism has shifted the distribution of political power, income and wealth toward
rentiers. Consistent with this story, we show that the rentier fraction of income goes up
when real interest rates increase, when there is greater financial liberalization and economic
openness; and rentiers when labor is less politically unified.
We wish here to be somewhat cautious however about the interpretations. We do not make
any strong claims that our empirical exercise proves causality. Our purpose here has not
been to offer a series of completely identified regressions (which would be close to
impossible given our limited data and the cross-country context), but rather to provide some
empirical support for the substantial political economy literature on the subject. The
substantial and careful evidence gathered by political scientists, historians of finance and
some economists suggests that rentiers act precisely in this manner (eg., Helleiner, 1994;
Babb 2001). These rich accounts provide important evidence that rentier groups abhor
inflation, try to influence monetary policy to fight inflation, push for financial liberalization
and economic openness. In conjunction with this historical evidence, the econometric
evidence here provides support for the view that rentiers benefit from neo-liberal policies,
and are likely to be among their strongest supporters.
Of course, much future work remains to be done. A first order of business is to construct
rentier data series for more countries, and especially for developing countries. Secondly,
more work needs to be done on the impact of increases in rentier incomes on economic
outcomes. What impact do increases in rentier incomes have on real investment and
productivity growth? What are the channels through which rentier incomes might affect
economic outcomes? A second area of important research is to expand the notion of rentier
incomes to include those profits of non-financial corporations that come from financial
activities. Such an extension would help us expand our notion of the rentier class in ways
that might better capture its true significance in contemporary capitalist economies.
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Figure 1: Trade Unionization and Rentier Return in selected OECD Countries
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Figure 2: Interest Rate Liberalization and Real Rentier Return
Impact of Interest Rate Liberalization on Real Rentier Share
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USA (1982)

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Real Rentier Share

292

0.06

0.05

-0.23

0.17

Real GDP Per Worker in 100000's

280

0.37

0.09

0.13

0.57

Trade Union Membership Fraction

285

0.36

0.18

0.08

0.79

Interest Rate Liberalization

272

0.66

0.48

0

1

Financial Openness

286

3.05

1.13

0

4

Right Wing Government

264

2.16

0.99

0

3

Budget Deficit

272

-0.04

0.04

-0.15

0.03

Government Share

275

0.12

0.05

0.03

0.23

Deposit to GDP ratio

233

0.76

0.26

0.32

1.42

Central Bank Assets to GDP

233

0.04

0.03

0.00

0.13

Note : Real Rentier Share refers to inflation adjusted rentier income normalized by real gross domestic product

Table 2: Real Rentier Fraction of Income 1960s-1990s
Country

Years

Australia

1975-1996

Belgium

1985-1997

1960s

1970s

1980s

1990s

Difference
90's-70s

Difference
90's-80's

0.1%

5.6%

10.2%

10.1%

4.6%

7.8%

9.0%

1.2%

Finland

1977-1996

-0.2%

1.4%

6.2%

6.4%

4.8%

France

1971-1996

-0.4%

5.6%

14.3%

14.7%

8.7%

Germany

1978-1993

3.1%

6.6%

6.9%

3.8%

0.3%

Great Britain

1971-1997

-4.2%

4.9%

8.6%

12.7%

3.7%

Italy

1978-1996

0.4%

4.2%

9.6%

9.2%

5.4%

Japan

1971-1996

-0.6%

8.1%

8.7%

9.2%

0.6%

Netherlands

1978-1996

7.5%

11.9%

13.8%

6.3%

1.8%

Norway

1979-1997

5.4%

6.3%

8.1%

2.8%

1.8%

Portugal

1977-1995

-11.4%

22.0%

7.1%

Spain

1981-1996

United States

1961-1996

3.6%

1.8%

3.5%

10.6%

3.3%

9.3%

9.7%

10.2%

5.9%
8.4%

0.5%

Note : Real Rentier Fraction refers to inflation adjusted rentier income normalized by real gross domestic
product
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TABLE 3: INFLATION RATES AND REAL INTEREST RATES IN SOME OECD COUNTRIES

Decade Average
Decade Average
Decade Average
Change from 70’s
Years Reported
Rate 1970s
Rate 1980s
Rate 1990s
to 90’s
Real
Real
Real
Real
Real
Inflation
Inflation
Inflation
Inflation Interest
Interest
Interest
Interest Inflation
Interest
Rate
Rate
Rate
Rate
Rate
Rate
Rate
Rate
Rate
Rate
AUSTRALIA
1970-1999
1975-1999
9.83
-.01
8.4
6.43
2.50
9.06
-7.33
9.07
BELGIUM
1970-1999
1981-1999
7.13
-4.9
7.59
2.14
7.16
-4.98
N/A
FINLAND
1970-1999
1977-1999
10.4
-.62
7.32
2.13
2.13
5.94
-8.27
6.56
GERMANY
1970-1999
1977-1999
4.81
-2.90
2.35
8.31
-2.56
N/A
ITALY
1970-1999
1971-1999
12.32
.39
4.70
6.83
4.12
2.28
-8.20
1.89
JAPAN
1960-1999
1970-1999
9.09
-.16
2.53
4.22
1.20
3.63
- 7.88
3.79
KOREA
1970-1999
1974-1999
15.21
-8.41
3.17
5.72
3.96
- 9.49
N/A
NETHERLANDS
1970-1999
1970-1999
4.32
9.71
2.87
7.58
2.44
6.12
-4.60
-3.59
NORWAY
1970-1999
1972-1999
8.37
6.25
8.34
6.96
2.44
7.80
- 5.92
1.55
UK
1970-1999
1960-1999
12.6
1.83
7.43
4.08
3.07
4.26
-8.91
2.43
US
1970-1999
1960-1999
5.5
1.08
5.55
6.25
3.00
5.73
-4.09
4.65
Source:
Inflation rates – Global Development Finance & World Development Indicators
Real interest rate – Global Development Finance & World Development Indicators. Missing data filled in
from Easterly, Rodriguez, and Schmidt-Hebbel "Public Sector Deficits and Macroeconomic Performance."
(Statistical appendix) 1994
Country
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Table 4: OLS Estimation of effect on inflation adjusted rentier fraction of income (with
country fixed effects)

(I)

(II)

(III)

(IV)

(V)

.005***

.008***

.007***

.005***

.006***

(0.0002)

(0.0008)

(0.0008)

(0.0008)

(0.0007)

-.48 ***

-.48 ***

-.36 ***

-.45 ***

(0.11)

(0.11)

(0.11)

(0.087)

-.20 ***

-.17 ***

-.16 ***

(0.04)

(0.05)

(0.05)

Interest
Liberalization

.030***

.024***

(0.006)

(0.005)

Financial Openness

.007**

.006**

(0.002)

(0.002)

Trend

Real GDP per worker
(in 100000s)
Trade Union
Membership

Right Wing
Government

.003 *
(0.002)

Budget Deficit

Government Share of
GDP
Deposits to GDP

Central Bank Assets
to GDP
Cross Sections
Observations
R squared (within)
F-test of
Intlib=Finopen=0

14

14

14

14

13

292

280

273

253

225

0.52

0.55

0.59

0.64

0.69

F(2, 230) = 17.6 F(2, 206) = 16.3
P=0.00
P=0.00

Note: All estimations have country fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses. *= significant at the
10% level, **=significant at the 5% level , ***=significant at the 1% level.
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Table 4: OLS Estimation of effect of inflation adjusted rentier fraction of income (with
country fixed effects) continued
(VI)

(VII)

(VIII)

(IX)

(X)

.006***

.007***

.006***

.006***

.004***

(0.0007)

(0.0008)

(0.0009)

(0.0009)

(0.0008)

Real GDP per worker
(in 100000s)

-.44***

-.47 ***

-.59 ***

-.56 ***

-.47 ***

(0.09)

(0.09)

(0.09)

(0.09)

(0.1)

Trade Union
Membership

-.16***

-.18***

-.17 ***

-.25 ***

-.19 ***

(0.04)

(0.05)

(0.05)

(0.05)

(0.06)

Interest
Liberalization

.024***

.023***

.027***

.03***

.04***

(0.006)

(0.006)

(0.006)

(0.006)

(0.006)

Financial Openness

.006**

.006**

.006*

.001

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.003)

(0.006)

Trend

Right Wing
Government
Budget Deficit

Government Share of
GDP

.003 *

0.003

.004*

0.002

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.002)

0.02

0.06

0.1

-0.01

(.07)

(.07)

(.08)

(.08)

0.1

0.04

0.02

(.07)

(.07)

(.07)

0.012

0.011

(.014)

(.013)

Deposits to GDP

Central Bank Assets
to GDP
Cross Sections
Observations
R squared (within)
F-test of
Intlib=Finopen=0

-.72***

-.28**

(.15)

(.12)

13
12
11
11
220
218
187
187
0.7
0.7
0.69
0.72
F(2, 200) = 13.42 F(2, 198) = 12.18 F(2, 167) = 16.31 F(2, 230) = 17.60
P=0.00
P=0.00
P=0.00
P=0.00

12
216
0.62

Note: All estimations have country fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses. *= significant at the
10% level, **=significant at the 5% level , ***=significant at the 1% level.
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Table 5a: GLS estimation of full model

Trend

0.0003
(.0005)

Real GDP per worker 0.181***
(in 100000s)
(.045)
Trade Union
Membership

-0.059***

Interest
Liberalization

0.038***

(.013)

(.006)

Financial Openness

-0.0003
(.0003)

Right Wing
Government

0.0006
(.0026)

Budget Deficit

-0.12
(0.08)

Government Share of
GDP

-0.024
(0.06)

Deposits to GDP

0.04***
(.0104)

Central Bank Assets
to GDP

-0.524***
(.108)

11

Groups
Observations
Wald Chi2
Prob>chi2

187
394.84

0
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Table 5b: GMM estimation of full model
I
Real Rental Share

.266***
(.0592)

Trend

.0039***
(.0009)

Real GDP per worker
(in 100000s)
Trade Union
Membership

.43***
(.08)

-.194
(.053)

Interest
Liberalization

.0216***
(.0059)

Financial Openness

-.001
(.002)

Right Wing
Government

.0025
(.0022)

Budget Deficit

.00013
(.0007)

Government Share of
GDP

.00048

Deposits to GDP

.0072

(.0006)

(.012)

Central Bank Assets
to GDP

-.71***
(.14)
11

Groups
Observations
Wald chi2

171
578.37

Note : Real Rentier Share refers to inflation adjusted rentier income normalized by real gross domestic product
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APPENDIX A

The data on rentier incomes were constructed from the OECD National Accounts Vol. II CD
ROM. Rentier income is the sum of financial sector profits, interest (and in some cases,
dividends) receivable by all non-financial non-government resident institutional units.
More specifically, using the United Nations accounting definitions from the 1993 system of
national accounts, our definition of rentier income is as follows:
(1) Rentier Income = (Entrepreneurial Income of the financial sector) + (interest
receivable by households) + (interest receivable by not-for-profit organizations)
Entrepreneurial income of the financial sector, in turn, is defined as follows:
(2) Entrepreneurial income of the financial sector = Operating Surplus + property
income – interest payable - rent payable
Property income of the financial sector is defined as:
(3) Property income of the financial sector = dividends + reinvested earnings +
insurance income received + rent received + interest received
Thus, rentier income, as defined in this paper, as the profits of the financial sector, plus the
interest received by households and not-for profit organizations. In turn, the rentier return is
the rentier income as defined above divided by gross national product (net of government
expenditures since we have excluded the government income from rentier income, the
numerator).
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Appendix B
A simple bargaining model of rentier income
Consider an economy in which firms produce according to a generic production function.
Y = F ( L, K )

(1)

Where L is the argument in Labor, K is the argument in physical capital. FL > 0,
FK > 0. Where Fi is the partial derivative of F with respect to i.
The profit function of a representative firm is as follows

π = F ( L, K ) − wL − rK − Z

(2)

Where w is the wage rate, r is the rental rate on physical capital.
Firms absorb W ,a stock of debt that can be used in future periods to invest and make
interest payments on this debt equal to iW from operating surplus where i is the real interest
rate on financial capital. Note that W -the stock of debt of the firm- is also the stock of
wealth of lenders, or the rentier class.
We define

Z = iW

(2a)

as the rentier return which refers to the payment to the financial capitalist or rentier at the
end of the production period.
Consider now the problem of bargaining over wage and employment between a
representative labor union, the firm and the financial capitalist. The bargaining game is
assumed to follow Nash's cooperative solution and is hence efficient in the sense that all
equilibria occur on the contract plane. In the event of a breakdown in negotiations, the firm
is assumed to be able to obtain a return from an alternative activity equal to π*.
Unions care both about employment and wages. The representative union maximizes the
rents accruing to the workers in the respective firm (wL). Thus the objective function can be
represented as:
U(w, L) = G(L;w; w*)

(3)

where w* is the fallback wage.
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The rentier's objective function is to maximize their returns, Z which can be written as the
residual from total output minus the firm's industrial profits.
The rentier is able to invest his capital in an alternative either domestically at an interest rate
of τd or abroad at an interest rate of τf. The former is constrained by the degree of domestic
financial repression (and thus increases with interest rate liberalization,φ) while the latter is
constrained by the obstacles to international capital mobility (and thus increases with capital
account openness, μ). As such, the rentiers fallback position can be written as Z*
=max[τd(φ); μ(τf)]. We assume that Z* is increasing in φ, μ and τf.
Assuming that the exogenously given bargaining power of the union is α and that the
corresponding power of the firm is β (and that the resulting bargaining power of rentiers is
(1- α−β) with α,β ε[0,1]) we obtain the generalized Nash product as follows:
Ψ = (G(L, w; w*) ) (π − π *) (Z − Z *)
α

β

1−α − β

(4)

taking logs this becomes

Ω = α log(G(L, w; w*)) + β log(π − π *) + (1 − α − β ) log(Z − Z *)

(5)

We have six first order conditions: Ωw=0, ΩL=0, Ωr=0, ΩK=0, Ωz=0
Focusing on the last of these we have
Ωz = 0 ⇔

β
(1 − α − β )
=
(π − π *) (Z − Z *)

(6)

which can be rearranged to give
Z=

(1 − α − β )(π − π *)

(β )

+Z*

(7)

from which we can obtain the following comparative statics:
Zα = −

Zβ =

(π − π *) < 0
(β )

(8a)

(π − π *)(α − 1) < 0

(8b)

β2

Z φ = Z *φ ≥ 0

(8c)
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Zμ = Z *μ ≥ 0

(8d)

Z τ = Z *τ ≥ 0

(8e)

Equations (8a-8e) show that, as is to be expected, rentier income rises unambiguously with a
fall in the bargaining power of labor and a fall in the bargaining power of industrial
capitalists. Rentier income weakly increases with internal interest rate liberalization and
with a rise in the achievable rate of return from abroad (the product of the rate of return on
financial assets abroad and the openness to international capital flows).
For our empirical estimations, we wish to take into account a problem that arises when we
consider inflation. Specifically, inflation erodes the value of net financial wealth. Some
portion of the rentier income that is received by rentiers is eroded when there is inflation.
We define the ‘inflation adjusted rentier return’ as the nominal returns accruing to the
rentier minus the loss of wealth due to increases in inflation. Since our data does not have
the nominal stock of wealth, we perform an adjustment as below for our empirical measure
of rentier returns.
Let:
Zr=inflation adjusted rentier income
p*= the inflation rate
W=nominal debt = nominal stock of wealth
R= nominal rentier income
i=nominal interest rate
ρ=real interest rate
By definition
(1) Zr =inflation adjusted rentier income = i*W - p*W
That is, inflation adjusted rentier income is nominal rentier income (i*W) minus the loss of
wealth due to inflation (p *W).
Equivalently
(2) Zr = ρ W
Now the problem is that for all the countries we are interested in, our data does not have the
nominal stock of wealth. We do, however have W, the nominal rentier income. We use this
to approximate the stock of wealth by assuming that nominal rentier income is like a consol
payment from the stock of wealth. Thus
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(3) W = R/i
Then substituting (3) into (2) we get:
(4) Zr = R (ρ/i)
Our inflation adjusted rentier return takes the nominal rentier income and then multiplies it
by the ratio of the real interest rate to the nominal interest rate. It should be noted that Zr will
therefore be negative if the real interest rate is negative. In such a scenario, the rentier is
actually providing an implicit subsidy to the industrial capitalist, and thus his real return in
that period is negative (his wealth decreases).
In our estimates, we divide this figure by real GDP to obtain a measure of the size of this
return.
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